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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the consequences of restrictions to migration at the origin on labor market 
outcomes and school enrolment in origin communities. Our difference-in-differences specification 
exploits the differential impact across districts in Indonesia of a reform that restricted the migration 
of Indonesian female domestic workers towards Saudi Arabia in 2011. Our results suggest that this 
reform did not lead to higher unemployment in Indonesia, but it increased the proportion of workers 
employed in informal jobs and in agriculture. No detectable change in the consumption patterns of 
Indonesian households appears from our analysis, suggesting that rural areas in Indonesia could 
absorb the sudden increase in the availability of workforce. Our findings also show an increase in 
junior secondary school enrolment of both males and females, arguably reflecting the importance 
of the maternal presence in the household for the investment in human capital of children. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
The number of international migrants has increased by 41 percent worldwide over the past 15 
years, reaching 244 million in 2015, compared with 173 million in 2000. This increase 
represents a net expansion in the proportion of migrant population, given that over the same 
period the world population grew at 19 percent (UN International Migration Report, 2015). 
Migration policies, however, still seem to remain in the domain of national governments in 
receiving countries, and bilateral agreements between sending and destination countries still 
represent the exception. This is not surprising, given that for decades migration policies have 
experienced less cross-country coordination and liberalization compared to trade policies 
(Hatton, 2007). 
 Although for decades international migration has remained off the international 
development agenda (Pritchett, 2006), currently three of the seventeen new Sustainable 
Development Goals include migration related targets. At least in part, these reflect the 
recognition that the failure to design appropriate immigration and integration policies in both 
sending and receiving countries could significantly hinder the large potential benefits of 
international migration for the world economy (see, e.g., Walmsley and Winters, 2005). The 
international cooperation in the design of migration policies appears even more relevant in the 
case of many low- and middle-income countries, that display high emigration rates but also 
issues of weak implementation capacity, corruption, difficult coordination among government 
agencies, and poorly regulated labor markets.    
 This paper studies the effect of a restrictive emigration policy at the origin on labor 
market outcomes and school enrolment decisions in origin communities. Our empirical 
analysis presents evidence from Indonesia, which constitutes one of the major origin countries 
of international migrants. We assess the consequences of a reform in Indonesia that restricted 
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the international mobility of female domestic workers towards Saudi Arabia. Since Saudi 
Arabia traditionally represented the primary destination country of female Indonesian 
migrants, this reform directly affected hundreds of thousands of women. This migration 
restriction for female domestic workers (henceforth, moratorium) was introduced in response 
to increasingly frequent cases of abuses and harassment suffered by Indonesian domestic 
workers in Saudi Arabia and other Middle-Eastern countries during the mid- and late 2000s. 
Since hundreds of thousands of women used to migrate to the Middle East from Indonesia 
every year, this reform resulted in a unique large-scale natural experiment. Also, the reform is 
quite unique and unusual in the international landscape, where normally migration restrictions 
are imposed by destination countries to regulate migration inflows, and resembles somehow 
the restrictions to emigrate towards Western Europe or the US in place in former Soviet Union 
Republics until the late 1980s.   
 The spatial variation in the destination countries of international migrants across 
Indonesian districts allows us to define a difference-in-differences specification, whereby the 
outcomes of interest in origin districts of migrants towards Saudi Arabia are compared with 
those in control districts, i.e., all other districts in Indonesia. Thus, control districts include 
origin regions of migrants towards all other international destinations. We exploit this spatial 
heterogeneity in the intensity of the ‘intention-to-treat’ (ITT) exposure to the 2011 reform to 
study the labor market and school enrolment effects of (e)migration restrictions in origin 
communities. Our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of treatment. Further, 
we validate our results by running a set of falsification exercises, showing that we cannot find 
any significant effects on the outcomes of interest in districts sending migrants to destinations 
not affected by the Saudi Arabia moratorium. 
4 
 
 Our results suggest that the migration moratorium to Saudi Arabia did not result in 
increased unemployment in affected areas. This conclusion applies to both men and women. 
However, our analysis also suggests that the migration moratorium induced considerable 
churning in origin local labor markets, as we find detectable increases in employment in the 
informal sector and in agriculture in the treatment group districts. Our event-study estimates 
show there being no differential pre-treatment trends in these labor market outcomes between 
treatment and control districts. This allows us to interpret the observed patterns as the result of 
the migration moratorium in 2011. For both men and women, the 2011 migration moratorium 
led to an increase in the fraction of workers employed in the informal sector and in the fraction 
of workers in agriculture. In the subsequent part of our empirical analysis, we also investigate 
the effect of the 2011 moratorium on the consumption patterns of Indonesian households. This 
analysis reveals no detectable discrepancy between the consumption patterns of treatment and 
control group households. We interpret these results as suggestive that the informal and the 
agricultural sectors were able to absorb the sudden increased availability of labor in Indonesia. 
The final part of our analysis documents a significant increase in enrolment in junior secondary 
school of both males and females in treatment group regions. Since we find a similar effect for 
both males and females, we interpret this as reflective of the importance of the maternal 
presence in the household for the investment in education of children. These results contribute 
to the growing economics literature on the effects of migration policies, as they provide novel 
evidence on the economic consequences of restrictions to migration at the origin. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the contribution of this study to 
the existing literature. Section 3 illustrates the Indonesian policy context and the introduction 
of the 2011 migration moratorium. Section 4 presents our empirical strategy, and Section 5 
presents our results. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Relevant Literature 
Although the population of international migrants increased markedly over the past 15 years, 
actual international migration flows are still relatively small in size compared with the total 
world population: the foreign-born population constituted only 3.38 percent of the world 
population in 2015 (UN International Migration Report, 2015), and 10 percent of the 
population in OECD countries in 2010 (Ortega and Peri, 2015). Restrictive immigration 
policies in receiving countries are often indicated as the main reason for low international 
mobility (see, e.g., Pritchett 2006). Since restrictions to migration are generally imposed by 
recipient countries, it is not surprising that the majority of studies has focused on restrictions 
to (im)migration at destination. Focusing on immigration restrictions, Ortega and Peri (2012) 
document that, on average, migration restrictions decrease immigration by 6 percent among 
rich countries. Theoharides (2016) documents the effects of the restriction pursued by the 
Japanese government in 2005 to the immigration of Overseas Performing Artists (OPAs) from 
the Philippines. She finds that the reform reduced migration flows over and above its intended 
purpose for the restricted entertainers, as negative spillovers extended to other types of 
potential migrants in the Philippines. She also finds that this restriction to migration resulted in 
increased labor force participation rates, lower levels of income, and greater incidence of child 
labor in mostly affected communities in the Philippines. Some recent studies have also 
attempted to measure the unrealized economic gains due to excessively restrictive immigration 
policies, generally concluding that these gains may be very large. Klein and Ventura (2009), 
Clemens (2011), and Di Giovanni et al. (2015), are some of the studies that document large 
potential gains from liberalizing international migration. Facchini and Mayda (2009), Boeri 
(2010), and Facchini et al. (2011), complement this literature by providing evidence on the 
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economic and political forces that determine the formation of the immigration policies of the 
host countries.  
 This study contributes to a number of strands of the migration literature. First, we 
contribute to the recent literature that examines the consequences of migration policies by 
focusing on an unusual restriction to emigration imposed at the origin by a major net exporter 
of international migrants. Due to the rarity of this reform, the migration moratorium 
implemented in Indonesia since 2011 provides the rare opportunity to assess the consequences 
of a large-scale restrictive migration policy at the origin. In this respect, our work differs from 
Theoharides (2016) and is more closely aligned with Dinkelman and Mariotti (2016), who also 
analyse the consequences of restrictions to migration at the origin. In particular, these authors 
exploit two exogenous policy shocks which generated first an expansion, and then a sudden 
and permanent drop in the flows of Malawian workers recruited by mining companies in South 
Africa: the removal of an existing quota on Malawian workers in South Africa in 1967, and a 
permanent labor ban dictated by the Malawian President, after a plane crash killed 70 returning 
migrants in 1974. Their analysis shows the long-run positive consequences of emigration on 
human capital accumulation in sending communities. 
 This study also contributes to the literature on the effects of emigration on the origin 
labor market, by focusing on a context where migration is predominantly a female 
phenomenon. Until recently, very few papers have looked at the effects on local labor markets 
of emigration in the countries of origin (Hatton, 2014), and this literature has mostly focused 
on the effect of emigration on non-migrants’ wages. The general conclusion that emerges from 
this literature is that emigration is likely to exercise upward pressure on wages due to the 
reduced supply of labor in the origin market. Nonetheless, in most of the contexts examined in 
the literature, migrants are often males. Taylor and Dyer (2009), in their simulation from rural 
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Mexico, conclude that emigration impacts positively on wages in origin communities where 
transactions are frequent among households. Mishra (2007) finds that emigration from Mexico 
in the 1990s caused the relative wage of high-school graduates to increase by 4 percent, and 
the wages of those who completed college by 3 percent. Evidence from Mexico of a positive 
effect of emigration on local wages is also presented by Aydemir and Borjas (2007) and by 
Hanson (2007b). Borjas (2008) finds similar effects for Puerto Rico, and Bouton et al. (2009) 
for Moldova. Other studies exploring the effect of emigration on wages of non-migrating 
nationals are Dustmann et al. (2012), and Elsner (2013a, 2013b). Airola (2008), Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo (2006), and Hanson (2007a and 2007b), present evidence that labor supply 
decreases in Mexico as a result of migration. Acosta (2006 and 2007) finds similar conclusions 
from El Salvador, while Damon (2009) shows additional evidence from rural El Salvador that 
the effect of foregone labor induced by emigration may actually increase on-farm labor hours 
for all family members and substantially reduce hours of off-farm labor for males. 
 We contribute to this literature by assessing the consequences of the 2011 migration 
moratorium for female domestic workers traveling to Saudi Arabia on origin labor markets in 
Indonesia. International migration is a large scale phenomenon in Indonesia which involves 
hundreds of thousands of women every year, it is predominantly a female phenomenon, and 
until 2011 Saudi Arabia constituted the primary destination country for female migrants from 
Indonesia. Thus, the 2011 migration moratorium to Saudi Arabia provides the rare opportunity 
to study the effect of female migration on origin labor markets. Given that important gendered 
patterns may emerge in the labor market effects of emigration, we view this as an important 
element of contribution of our work.  
 Finally, we also contribute to the literature that studies the effect of migration on the 
so-called ‘care-drain’ and family disintegration. Parental absence is often found to generate 
8 
 
significant effects on health, education, social relations and family cohesion in the origin 
household (for a review of the literature, see Antman, 2013). Ehrenreich and Hochschild 
(2003), D’Cunha (2005), Oishi (2005), and Fudge (2010), are some of the studies that describe 
the socioeconomic and political factors pushing women from developing countries to emigrate 
and work as carers for children or the elderly in richer countries. In the case of Indonesia, 
Nguyen and Purnamasari (2011) find that female migration does not lower labor-force 
participation of remaining household members as they do in the case of male migration. 
Moreover, they find that international migration reduces child labor supply in households with 
female migrants. Using different sources of microdata on local labor markets in Indonesia, as 
well as a novel identification strategy, we present new evidence on the effects of female 
migration on labor market outcomes, per capita consumption, and the school enrolment of 
children in origin communities in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
3. Policy Context: Restrictions to International (E)migration in Indonesia 
Before the introduction of recent migration restrictions, Indonesian migration was largely 
driven by female migration. Figure 1 uses administrative data on annual documented flows to 
show that, in 2006, female migrants accounted for 80% of total documented migrants 
(BNP2TKI). In the same year, female migrants to Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, the two top 
destinations of Indonesian migrant workers, represented 55% of total (documented) flows, and 
70% of total female migrants. These figures reflect the result of a rapid “feminization” of 
migration flows in Indonesia during the previous decade, most likely spurred by an increasing 
demand for domestic workers from the Middle East and from neighboring countries. In less 
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than ten years, the female share on total documented migrants rose from 56% in 1996, to 68% 
in 2000, reaching 78% in 2004 (IOM, 2010).   
 The statistics from BNP2TKI, unfortunately, do not permit a more detailed breakdown 
of documented flows by migrants’ characteristics. However, data from the recent World Bank 
Survey on Indonesia International Migration and Remittances (WB-IMR Survey, World Bank, 
2014a) show that over 72 percent of Indonesian migrants come from rural areas of the country. 
Further, the same source confirms that Indonesian women overseas are predominantly 
employed as domestic workers (representing over 80% percent of total female migrants), as 
opposed to men, mostly employed in agriculture and construction (around 70% percent of total 
male migrants). The WB-IMR Survey also shows that female migrants are mostly low-skilled, 
with 50% of them having only primary education, and 30% of them having junior secondary 
education.  
 Emigration in Indonesia is a complex and lengthy process, on paper highly regulated, 
involving a number of intermediaries and several administrative steps (in Appendix A, we 
identify at least 22 procedures required before departure). In order to be able to work overseas, 
Indonesian workers need to apply for a KTKLN card, a special ID card for migrant workers 
obtainable only with a job offer from a foreign employer. Migrants can apply at local 
Manpower Offices (Disnaker), or at BNP3TKI offices (local branches of BNP2TKI). However, 
in rural areas, where these facilities are not always available, prospective migrants are more 
likely to apply through local agencies or informal sponsors. Migrants frequently lack complete 
information about the job offered and their prospective employer, since the intermediation is 
usually carried out between migration agencies in Indonesia and their counterparts at 
destination; at the same time, the heterogeneity in the quality of agencies is high (IOM, 2010). 
Further, even in the presence of a written job offer, substantial contractual rights might be 
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excluded or under-enforced. Despite the complex de jure regulation in place on paper, de facto 
migrants are therefore exposed to risks at all stages of the migration process. Further, claims 
of abuse and exploitation appear common, ranging from unpaid wages to inadequate rest and 
physical abuse (Farbenblum et. al., 2013, and IOM, 2010).  
 In an attempt to respond to these challenges, and following a series of tragic cases 
involving tortures, murders and death sentences experienced in Saudi Arabia by Indonesian 
female domestic workers, the Indonesian government imposed a moratorium on migration of 
female domestic workers from Indonesia to Saudi Arabia in June 2011. As Saudi Arabia was 
not the only placement country where international female migrants reported similar 
experiences, placement countries on which recent moratoria to migration by the Indonesian 
government also applied include Malaysia from June 2009 (although this moratorium was 
lifted in 2011), Kuwait from September 2009, Jordan from July 2010, Syria from August 2011, 
the United Arab Emirates from October 2013, and Qatar from November 2013. In 2015, the 
migration ban was extended to 21 countries across the Middle East, North- and East-Africa, 
and Pakistan (Ministry of Manpower, and BNP2TKI).  
 Although the large number of restrictions to emigration recently imposed by the 
Indonesian government reflects the importance of ensuring the security of migrants overseas 
in the political discussion in Indonesia, this paper focuses on the migration moratorium to Saudi 
Arabia in 2011. This was the largest ban to migration among those recently implemented in 
Indonesia, as Saudi Arabia, until 2011, constituted the placement country for the largest 
number of female migrant workers from Indonesia. The announcement of the emigration ban 
to Saudi Arabia in June 2011 was triggered by the execution of Ruyati Binti Sapubi, an 
Indonesian maid who allegedly killed her employer’s wife after suffering repeated abuses. 
After the announcement of the ban, the Saudi government in turn announced the suspension of 
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work permits to Indonesian domestic workers (The Economist, 2011). It is therefore likely that 
this moratorium, which was enforced in Indonesia since August 2011, had been binding for the 
intended target group. The circumstances were similar to those triggering the 2009 emigration 
ban to Malaysia. However, in December 2011, the moratorium to Malaysia was lifted, after the 
two governments signed a Protocol aimed at improving the living and working conditions of 
migrant workers (Hickey et al., 2013, and ILO, 2016).    
 Coordination problems and duplications of functions between the Ministry of 
Manpower and BNP2KI might have hindered the full enforcement of migration restrictions in 
a way which remains difficult to quantify empirically (see Farbenblum et. al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the extent to which undocumented migration flows might have been affected by 
the moratoria appears unclear a priori. Undocumented migration, in fact, is an important 
phenomenon in Indonesia that is difficult to quantify. Undocumented flows are not included in 
BNP2TKI administrative data, and in areas of low compliance with government regulations, 
undocumented flows may have increased as a result of the 2011 reform. For instance, the Strait 
of Malacca between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula is known to be a channel through which 
undocumented Indonesian migrants, typically facilitated by a local taikong1, reach Malaysia to 
work informally without contract or protection (see Human Rights Watch, 2004, Kaur, 2004, 
Wong, 2005, and IOM, 2010). These type of flows might be less likely to be discouraged by 
the restrictions introduced. A recent report by the World Bank (World Bank, 2016), argues that 
in fact in some cases undocumented migration might have even increased, as a response to the 
moratoria. On the other hand, in areas characterized by better compliance with migration 
regulations (e.g. because of a larger presence of formal recruiting channels), undocumented 
flows might have been further discouraged. Given the challenges associated to the 
                                                          
1 Term used in Indonesia to identify a smuggler, or an informal/illegal sponsor (Kaur, 2004, and Wong, 2005).  
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measurement of undocumented migration, our preferred reduced form estimates of the first-
order effect of the 2011 moratorium on migration flows are based on documented flows. The 
next section discusses in detail how this information is relevant to our empirical strategy.  
 
4. Identification Strategy and First Order Effects of Migration Restrictions 
Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 provide descriptive evidence of the effect of the moratoria to Saudi Arabia 
and other countries on documented migration flows. Figure 2 shows that between 2010 and 
2011, when the moratorium to Saudi Arabia was enacted, the yearly flows of female migrants 
dropped from 203.625 to 110.641 individuals, and by 2012 this number plunged further to only 
18.356 individuals. In the case of Malaysia, given the relative importance of male migration to 
this destination, the drop in the yearly flows of female documented migrants appears less 
substantial in absolute terms. Weaker enforcement capacity in regions predominantly sending 
migrants to Malaysia might explain why, after the introduction of the moratorium, the flows of 
documented female migrants did not fall more dramatically. Furthermore, the removal of the 
moratorium after 2011 might explain the slight recovery of female migration to Malaysia. 
Figure 3 shows that, given the overall importance of female migration in Indonesia, also the 
trends in total documented migration flows to Saudi Arabia resulted heavily affected by the 
2011 moratorium.  
 Figures 2 and 3 also suggest that alternative migration destinations did not act as strong 
substitutes for female domestic workers, a finding that appears consistent with the lack of 
fungibility in migration opportunities documented in Theoharides (2016). After 2011, the 
foregone migrants to Saudi Arabia were seemingly unable to switch to alternative overseas 
destinations in the short run. In part this is plausibly explained by the fact that other Middle 
East countries were facing similar challenges of abuse and harassment, and were themselves 
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subject, with different timings, to migration restrictions in recent years. Migration flows 
towards alternative destinations (such as Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong) gradually 
increased over time, but only partially compensated for the dramatic drop in flows to Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia. Also, due to the more demanding educational requirements in place to 
migrate to Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, these alternative destinations may not have been 
viable options for domestic workers affected by the 2011 moratorium. As shown in Figure 4, 
also male migration did relatively little to substitute for the drop in female migrants in recent 
years.  
 Since it is not possible to identify exactly in the administrative data the number of 
domestic workers by gender and destination country, in Figure 5 we use information on 
placements by job type at destination. According to the classification of BNP2TKI, “informal 
jobs” at destination would correspond mostly to those of maids and domestic workers. In line 
with the previous charts, Figure 5 shows that the share of informal placements halved following 
the 2011 moratorium, dropping from over 83% in 2009 to 42% in 2014. In sum, this evidence 
suggests that the migration restriction implied by the 2011 moratorium was indeed binding for 
most of the prospective female migrants to Saudi Arabia in the short run. 
 In the first part of our empirical analysis, we quantify the first-order, intended effects 
of the 2011 moratorium on international migration flows from Indonesia. To this end, we use 
data from the Podes village census, which includes information about village geographic 
characteristics, infrastructure, political participation, main sources of economic activity, and 
number of village residents working abroad as documented migrants (TKI) during the survey 
year. Moreover, in 2005, Podes also collected information on the main destination country for 
people emigrating from each village. Further, in the same year, the gender breakdown of the 
total number of migrants was also collected. The information is reported by the Head of the 
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village, and is based on administrative records of international migrants. The fact that the 
National Statistics Office (BPS) fully validates the statistical information included in each 
wave of the village census further mitigates concerns on the reliability of the statistics on 
documented migrants in Podes. In fact, Podes data are known to match well the aggregate 
number of documented migrants reported by BNP2TKI, as well as those obtained from national 
household surveys (Bazzi, 2012).  
 In our empirical analysis we defined a treatment group and a control group of regions 
by exploiting heterogeneity across districts in the pre-existing female migration corridors to 
Saudi Arabia. With “district”, here we mean kabupaten/kota, known in Indonesia as 
“regencies”/”cities”, the main administrative subdivision of provinces. These were at the core 
of the process of decentralization and democratization of Indonesia that followed the fall of 
Soeharto in May 1998. Starting from 1999, kabupaten/kota were granted considerable authority 
and independence over the elections of local governments and the administration of local 
finances. From the administrative standpoint, they include various kecamatan (“sub-districts”), 
which in turn are sub-divided in villages (kelurahan/desa). In modern Indonesia, districts 
constitute a relevant spatial unit from an economic as well as political point of view.  
 Although, in principle, every region was affected by the 2011 moratorium to migration, 
the intensity of the intention-to-treat (ITT) implied by the reform may have varied across 
regions due to the importance of migration networks overseas (Munshi, 2003; Beaman, 2012; 
and Theoharides, 2016). Since information on migration by destination country and by gender 
prior to the 2011 reform is only available from Podes 2005, we used this dataset to identify the 
villages that, prior to the 2011 moratorium, used to send female migrants mostly to Saudi 
Arabia, as well as those that used to send female migrants to other destinations and those that 
were not origin villages for female migrants. Since all other socioeconomic outcomes of 
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interest in this paper are collected in separate surveys, namely the National Labor Force Survey 
(Sakernas) and the National Household Consumption Survey (Susenas) of Indonesia, and the 
most detailed level of spatial disaggregation common to all datasets used was the district, we 
aggregated up the information collected from Podes 2005 at the district level. To be precise, 
districts where the majority of female migrants in 2005 travelled to Saudi Arabia were grouped 
in our treatment group, whereas all remaining districts formed our control group2. In our 
econometric analysis, we exploit this spatial variation to retrieve the ITT causal impact of the 
2011 moratorium on labor market outcomes and school enrolment in origin communities. Since 
the Sakernas and the Susenas datasets provide us with an array of information on the socio-
economic circumstances of individuals, they are collected every year on the entire national 
territory and they are representative at the district level (as well as nationally), we can use the 
variation in space and time in our data to estimate a difference-in-differences specification and 
retrieve our causal parameters of interest. 
 Table 1 compares average characteristics of villages in treatment and control districts 
in 2005. Villages in treatment districts appear to be more populated, they display a greater 
fraction of Muslim population and a higher number of mosques and primary schools on 
average. They are also less likely to be coastal villages, and they rely more frequently on 
industrial production as their main source of income. In contrast, treatment and control regions 
appear similarly distributed between urban and rural areas, they rely similarly on agriculture 
and mining, they have similar numbers of secondary schools and their village heads feature 
comparable characteristics. 
 Figure 6 shows that female migrants on average constituted roughly 0.4 percent of 
population in treatment group districts. In 95 percent of treatment group districts, female 
                                                          
2 In our analysis we test the robustness of our results to alternative plausible definitions of treated and untreated 
districts. 
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migrants did not exceed 1.5 percent of population, and they never exceeded roughly 2 percent 
of population. This suggests that our results are unlikely to be driven by a few villages with 
unusually high rates of outmigration, and they are rather likely to be uniformly distributed 
across observations in our treatment group. Figure 7 shows the distribution of treatment 
districts across provinces in Indonesia. Treatment districts do not appear concentrated in any 
particular part of the archipelago, but rather they appear uniformly distributed across islands. 
No treated districts are found in 16 provinces3. In four provinces, namely East Java, Riau, South 
Sulawesi and West Sumatera, between 4 and 8 percent of individuals are in treated districts. In 
seven provinces, between 8 and 33 percent of individuals are in treated districts: these are, 
namely, Central Java, Gorontalo, Jambi, Maluku, West Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and 
West Sulawesi. Finally, more than 33 percent of individuals appear in treated districts in the 
remaining six provinces of Indonesia, namely Banten, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, 
DKI Jakarta, South Kalimantan, and West Java. The fact that observations in treatment and 
control districts are distributed uniformly across regions in Indonesia, in turn, mitigates 
concerns that our reduced form estimates may be contaminated by unobserved, region-specific 
and time-varying shocks, e.g., such as the slowdown in the commodity boom in the early 2010s, 
which may have affected our labor market outcomes of interest differently across regions.  
 In the regression analysis, we estimate a series of difference-in-differences 
specifications at the individual level to assess the effect of the 2011 moratorium on our socio-
economic outcomes of interest. We use the yearly Sakernas of Indonesia from 2005-2014 to 
measure whether individual i in year t was unemployed, whether s/he was employed in the 
informal sector, and whether s/he was employed in agriculture. Using the yearly Susenas of 
Indonesia from 2004-2014, we measure the level of real per capita consumption of Indonesian 
                                                          
3 These are, namely, Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam, Bali, Bangka Belitung, Bengkulu, DI Yogyakarta, East 
Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, Kep Riau, Lampung, Maluku Utara, North Sulawesi, North Sumatera, Papua, 
Papua Barat, South Sumatera, Southeast Sulawesi. 
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households and the school enrolment status of the children in the household. For both datasets, 
we used all the survey years for which the data was available. In its functional form, our basic 
difference-in-differences specification can be expressed as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝐷𝑆𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿
′ (𝐷𝑆𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡)
+ 𝑋𝑖𝑡′𝜃 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 represents individual i’s outcomes of interest in year t (i.e., unemployment status, 
employment in the informal sector, employment in agriculture, log real per capita consumption 
and school enrolment of children). 𝐷𝑆𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 is a binary indicator that takes up value one if 
individual i resides in a treatment district, and it takes up value 0 otherwise. 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 is a vector 
of year fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  is a parsimonious vector of covariates to control for individual i’s 
gender, a quadratic of age and whether individual i resides in a rural or urban area. 𝜇𝑖 is a vector 
of district fixed effects. The coefficient 𝛿′ on the interaction term (𝐷𝑆𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) 
represents therefore the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the 2011 migration 
moratorium to Saudi Arabia on the dependent variable of interest.  
 
5. Results 
a. Effects of the moratorium on migration outflows 
The first question we address in our empirical analysis is whether the 2011 migration 
moratorium to Saudi Arabia achieved its intended objective of eliminating migration of female 
informal workers from Indonesia towards Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately information at this level 
of detail is not available for our analysis. This is because the Podes census of villages, which 
is the only source of information on migration outflows on the entire national territory, did not 
record information in every village and every census on the gender and destination of migrants. 
However, as information was collected on the aggregate number of migrants from each village 
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and in each census, using this data we were able to estimate the effect that the 2011 moratorium 
to migration to Saudi Arabia had on overall migration flows from villages in treatment and 
control districts respectively. To this end, we used data from the Podes census of villages from 
2005 to 2014 and we estimated the difference-in-differences specification in (1) to quantify the 
impact of the migration moratorium in 2011 on aggregate village-level migration outflows. 
Importantly, since the Podes census is conducted every three years, and in 2011 it was 
conducted in April, i.e., prior to the announcement of the migration moratorium in June 2011, 
the Podes census collected in 2014 provides our only post-period data available, whereas data 
collected in 2005, 2008 and 2011 provide us with information prior to the migration 
moratorium.  
 Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the first order effects of the moratoria to 
Saudi Arabia in 2011 on documented migration flows by 2014. The estimated difference-in-
differences coefficient provides evidence of a strong first-order negative effect of the 2011 
reform. While aggregate migration flows increased in Indonesia by 2014, villages in treatment 
districts experienced a significant decline in the number of out-migrants. This conclusion is 
robust to the inclusion in the estimated equation of time-varying characteristics at the village 
level and district fixed effects. As columns [2], [3], [5] and [6] show, weighting our estimates 
by population at baseline (i.e., in 2005), did not alter this conclusion. Overall, the results in 
Table 2 suggest that aggregate migration flows decreased by roughly 20 percent in treatment 
villages as a result of the 2011 migration moratorium.  As pointed out in Theoharides 
(2016), whether this is likely to be a lower-bound or an upper-bound estimate of the effect of 
the reform on the migration flows of informal female workers it intended to affect depends on 
the nature of the spillover effects of this foregone migration on the migration of others. If the 
migration of informal female workers was complementary to the migration of others, the results 
in Table 2 would overestimate the direct effect of the 2011 reform on informal female workers. 
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If, on the other hand, migration of informal female workers was a substitute of the migration 
of others, the direct effect of the 2011 reform on informal female workers would be greater 
than what is suggested by the results in Table 2. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we are 
unable to test this in our analysis. However, these results confirm the initial graphic impression 
that migration restrictions reached their intended outcomes of reducing migration flows in 
exposed villages. This result is important also because it shows that different geographic areas 
were exposed differently to the moratoria. This, in turn, justifies our use of a difference-in-
differences reduced-form specification in the rest of paper. 
b. Effects of the moratorium on labor market outcomes 
Having documented the spatially-heterogeneous negative impact of the 2011 migration 
moratorium on the international migration outflows of Indonesians, in this section we present 
the results from the estimation of equation (1) on our ‘unintended’ labor market outcomes of 
interest. The sudden impediment for female domestic workers to migrate overseas may have 
not only prevented the migration overseas of these workers, but it may have also had 
unintended repercussions on the labor markets and household living arrangements in their 
sending communities. In the remainder of this paper, we investigate these unintended outcomes 
of the 2011 migration restriction. 
 For the analysis of the impact of the 2011 reform on labor market outcomes, we 
combined the information on migration flows from Podes with yearly data from the 2005-2014 
Sakernas survey years. The results of this effort are shown in Table 3. For all outcome 
variables, to test for the existence of differential pre-treatment trends between treatment and 
control districts, we defined an event study setting where we allowed for separate treatment 
effects in each pre- and post-moratorium year. In all estimates, individual-level covariates 
include dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether they reside in a urban region 
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and a quadratic of age. Time fixed effects and district fixed effects were included in all our 
estimates. Since the treatment status was defined at the district level, robust standard errors 
were clustered at the district level in all cases.  
 In these estimates, since the Sakernas data that we use are collected in August every 
year, we treat 2011 as the first year post-moratorium to migration to Saudi Arabia. In this 
regard, it is also noticeable that the announcement of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia in June 
2011 followed an escalation of protests that occurred in the previous months against cases of 
mistreatment of Indonesian domestic workers. For instance, in April 2011, the initial three-
year sentence against a Saudi employer accused of torturing an Indonesian maid, was 
overturned by the appeals court, generating public outcry in Indonesia, as reported by local and 
international media (BBC, 2011a and 2011b). It is plausible that this mounting tension between 
Indonesian and Saudi authorities may have led to the immediate enforcement of the provisions 
of the 2011 migration moratorium. Thus, the 2011 reform may have produced detectable effects 
already by August 2011. Also for this reason, we treated 2011 as the first ‘post-treatment’ year 
in this part of our analysis.  
 Column [1] shows the results for unemployment for the full sample, while columns [2] 
and  [3] show the unemployment effects of the 2011 moratorium separately for men and 
women. In all cases, we could not detect any significant impact of the 2011 migration 
moratorium on unemployment. Figure 8 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent 
confidence intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on unemployment 
for the full sample. These event-study estimates show there to be no differential pre-treatment 
trends in unemployment rates between treatment and control districts. The joint test of 
significance of the pre-treatment coefficients shows them to be indistinguishable from zero at 
all conventional levels (i.e., 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.216). However, Figure 8 also confirms that no increase 
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in unemployment could be detected in our data as a result of the 2011 migration moratorium, 
since the post-treatment coefficients are not jointly statistically significant (i.e., 𝑃 > 𝐹 =
0.764). 
 Columns [4], [5] and [6] in Table 3 show the results of our difference-in-differences 
analysis where we estimate a linear probability model for being employed in the informal sector 
using the specification in equation (1). We hereby consider a worker as employed in the 
informal sector according to the Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) if one of the following 
conditions is met: i) the worker is a self-employed in the agriculture sector; ii) the worker is 
self-employed with temporary or unpaid workers; iii) the worker is a casual worker in either 
agriculture or non-agriculture sector; iv) the worker is an unpaid family member4. Column [4] 
shows that the 2011 migration moratorium led to a significant increase in the likelihood of 
individuals in treatment districts to be employed in informal jobs. Columns [5] and [6] show 
that significant increases in the likelihood to engage in informal jobs were observed for both 
men and women. Figure 9 shows point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals of our 
event study estimates of informality. Similarly to Figure 8, Figure 9 also displays tests of the 
joint significance of the pre-treatment and post-treatment coefficients in the equation. Figure 9 
shows the pre-treatment coefficients to be indistinguishable from zero (i.e., 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.164): 
the lack of  differential pre-treatment trends between treatment and control districts, therefore, 
allows us to interpret the effects for informality in Table 3 as causal. Post-treatment coefficients 
                                                          
4 According to this definition, 50.1 percent of total workers result employed in the informal sector in the year prior to 
the moratorium, 2010. This figure is not far from the informal employment rate released by the National Statistical 
Office for the same year (57 percent), which is based on a combination of workers’ occupation and sector characteristics. 
The measurement of informality is challenging in Indonesia for the period considered in our analysis, since neither the 
Sakernas nor the Susenas surveys include questions that enable to extract standard measures of informal employment, 
such as share of workers with a written contract, or share of workers contributing to compulsory social insurance and 
social security. Only in the 2016 Sakernas Labor Force Survey, a specific question for employees and casual workers 
was introduced, to assess whether they worked with written contracts. According to these most recent data, only 20 
percent of total workers reported to have a written contract in Indonesia, so our measure might underestimate the true 
size of informal employment.  
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in Figure 9 appear jointly statistically significant, and larger effects for informality can be 
detected in 2012 and persist until the end of our study period. 
 The estimated coefficient in column [6] of Table 3 indicates a 1.3 percentage points, or 
4.2 percent, increase in treatment districts in the female informality rate that is due to the 2011 
moratorium. This corresponds to an increase in the number of female informal workers by 
approximately 132.000 units. We could therefore speculate that 66 percent of the 
approximately 200.000 female migrants to Saudi Arabia who were not allowed to emigrate 
after 2010 (as shown by the drop in documented migrants to Saudi Arabia in Figure 2), could 
have been absorbed in informal jobs in treatment districts. 
 The results in columns [7], [8] and [9] in Table 3 show that the 2011 migration reform 
also led individuals in treatment districts to be more likely to engage in agriculture. The 
estimated positive effect is significant at all conventional levels for the full sample, as well as 
for both males and females separately. Figure 10 shows that, also in this case, no differential 
pre-treatment trends were observed between individuals in our treatment and control groups. 
Unlike the pre-treatment coefficients, the post-treatment coefficients appear jointly statistically 
significant. The positive effect in Table 3 appears driven also in this case by the positive effects 
from the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Again, the effects should be interpreted as an increase by 
1.6 (2.3) percentage points in the share of women (men) employed in agriculture in treatment 
districts after the moratorium, corresponding to an increase by over 200.000 (400.000) female 
(male) workers in agriculture in treatment districts over the period following the moratorium. 
 In sum, the lack of effects of the 2011 migration moratorium on unemployment in origin 
communities, seems to hide the considerable churning that occurred in the Indonesian labor 
markets as a result of this reform. The sudden impediment to migrate overseas for hundreds of 
thousands of women led these women and others in their communities to seek employment in 
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informality and agriculture. The analysis also documents detectable effects of the migration 
restriction on the labor market outcomes of males. Insofar as the moratorium led to foregone 
remittances, and thus resulted in a negative income shock, it is not surprising that this reform 
also had an effect on men, either directly (in the case of men connected to female migrants via 
family ties) or indirectly (via general equilibrium and/or spillover effects). The comparison of 
the estimated coefficients in Table 3 for men and women with their respective pre-moratorium 
rates of informality and employment in agriculture in control districts, show larger effects for 
women than for men. In particular, the 2011 moratorium led to a 3.8 percent increase in 
informality for males, and to a 4.2 percent increase for women. The 2011 moratorium also led 
to a 5.8 percent increase in employment in agriculture for men, and to a 6.8 percent increase 
for women. Indeed, this appears sensible, as women were the direct target of the 2011 migration 
moratorium.   
 These findings reflect the ability of rural areas in Indonesia to absorb large increases in 
the supply of labor (see Bazzi, 2016). However, the shift towards informality arguably also 
signals a worsening in the average quality of jobs in treatment districts, which may have been 
accompanied by a decrease in the living standards of Indonesian households in these regions. 
The labor market patterns documented in this section may have resulted in an impoverishment 
of the local population, due to the simultaneous loss of remittances from migrants and to the 
suboptimal alternatives available in local labor markets to absorb the excess supply of labor in 
the short run. This is in fact what we test in the following section, where we investigate the 
impact of the 2011 moratorium at the household level on household-level outcomes, i.e., on 
real per capita consumption and on school enrolment of children in the relevant ages.  
c. Effects of the moratorium on per capita consumption and school enrolment 
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The results in the previous section provided evidence that the migration restriction enacted by 
the Indonesian government did not affect substantially the unemployment rates in the local 
communities of origin, but rather induced a switch towards informal employment and 
employment in agriculture. In this section of the paper we complement this analysis using 
individual level data from the consumption household survey Susenas (Socio-Economic 
Survey of Indonesia). Using the Susenas 2004-2014 survey data, we examine the effects of the 
2011 migration moratorium on additional dimensions of households’ welfare, namely per 
capita consumption and school enrolment of children in schooling age (in primary and junior 
secondary school, for both males and females separately). 
 The 2011 migration moratorium may have affected per capita consumption in treatment 
communities via a simple income effect: the migration ban might have resulted in a fall in 
migrant women’s labor income and in a drop in remittances, which in turn may have induced 
a reduction in household consumption. By preventing access to financing from remittances 
from overseas, the migration ban may have also affected the consumption levels of migrants’ 
households: this is an outcome of primary interest, given that international migration represents 
a traditional strategy for poor rural households to escape poverty and sustain their origin 
families. This negative income effect may have been only partially offset by the engagement 
of the foregone migrants into informal and agricultural jobs.  
 The 2011 migration moratorium may have also had unintended consequences for school 
enrolment of children in origin households. Theoharides (2016), for example, finds that the 
Japanese migration ban in 2005 for OPAs from the Philippines resulted in an increase in child 
labor in the Philippines. Since informal female workers from Indonesia are generally middle-
aged women that would normally leave their children behind when they migrate, this natural 
experiment allows us to examine the effect of the maternal presence in the household on 
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children’s schooling outcomes. Most of the related literature has explored the effect of parental 
absence on educational outcomes of children left behind in contexts in which migrants are men; 
thus this literature has examined, de facto, the consequences of the absence of the father when 
he becomes a migrant. Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003), Yang (2008) and Alcaraz et al. (2012) 
are some recent studies that document a positive impact of emigration on the educational 
achievement of children left behind, mostly through remittances. Antman (2011) provides 
evidence from Mexico that spousal control over the intra-household allocation of resources is 
a major mechanism through which parental migration may affect children: while women have 
a greater control over the decision-making process of the household while the father is abroad, 
resources shift back to boys once the father has returned. Finally, a number of studies find 
evidence of detrimental effects of parental absence on the education of children, including 
Zoller Booth (1995) from Swaziland, Lahaie et al. (2009) from Mexico and Giannelli and 
Mangiavacchi (2010) from Albania. 
 For this analysis, we used all the available survey years of the Susenas from 2004 until 
2014 inclusive. The Susenas is a survey regularly conducted by BPS-Statistics Indonesia to 
collect information on consumption, housing conditions, social benefits, demographics, 
employment, education and other socioeconomic characteristics of households. It is 
representative at the kota/kabupaten (district) level, and is the main source of information for 
the calculation of official poverty and inequality statistics by BPS-Statistics Indonesia. 
 To estimate the effects of the 2011 migration moratorium on our household-level 
outcomes of interest, we estimated again the difference-in-differences specification in equation 
(1). Table 4 presents our results. Also in Table 4, all estimated equations include year and 
district fixed effects. The set of additional covariates is also identical to the set of covariates 
used for the analysis of labor market outcomes in the previous section. Columns [1] and [2] of 
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Table 4 show that the migration moratorium in 2011 had no detectable effect on the (log) real 
per capita expenditure of households in treatment districts. The results in Figure 11 show no 
significant difference in our estimated pre-moratorium trends until 2010, which validates our 
interpretation of these results as causal. Also in this case, the test of joint significance of the 
pre-treatment coefficients shows them to be not statistically different from zero. Figure 11 also 
shows that the post-treatment coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero at the 
10% significance level. This could suggest that, due to the migration restriction and to the 
suboptimal alternatives immediately available to foregone migrants, living standards and 
welfare might have actually deteriorated in treatment regions after 2011. However, since the 
main difference-in-differences estimates in columns [1] and [2] of Table 4 are not 
distinguishable from zero, we do not find supportive evidence of a negative causal effect of the 
moratorium on log-consumption in treatment versus control districts.   
 Columns [3] to [6] in Table 4 report the estimated effect of the 2011 moratorium to 
Saudi Arabia on enrolment rates in primary and junior secondary education, separately for 
males and females. Results in columns [3] and [4] suggest that the moratorium to Saudi Arabia 
had no significant effect on the rate of enrolment in primary school, which is consistent with 
the fact that Indonesia reached almost everywhere full enrolment in primary education. On the 
contrary, we find a significant increase in both male and female enrolment in junior secondary 
school following the introduction of the 2011 migration restriction. Since no differential pre-
moratorium trends appear in Figures 12 and 13 for males and females respectively, we interpret 
these as the effects of the moratorium to migration implemented by the Indonesian government 
in 2011. The estimates in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 indicate that the 2011 moratorium led to 
an increase in male (female) enrolment in junior secondary school by 3.1 (3.8) percentage 
points in treatment districts, corresponding to a 4.8 (5.8) percent increase in school enrolment 
rates.  
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 Three potential channels could explain the increase in enrolment for pupils in junior 
secondary school following the moratorium. First, these results may reflect the importance of 
the maternal presence for children’s human capital investment: although the departure of 
female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia generates economic benefits for the origin 
households and communities, the departure of the mother can result in a loss of control over 
her children’s schooling trajectories. This is consistent with the importance of spousal control 
over the intra-household allocation of resources documented in Antman (2011), as it suggests 
that mothers have bargaining power within the household. In the absence of any bargaining 
power, mothers’ contribution to the household’s welfare would work only through remittances, 
and the negative income shock induced by the moratorium would be expected to result in a 
decrease in children’s enrolment rate (e.g., children could be involved in labor activities rather 
than sent to school, as to compensate for the drop in remittances). Until recently, very few 
studies have focused on this issue (Antman 2013), mostly because female migration is less 
common in the countries the literature has focused on. Jampaklay (2006), instead, finds that, 
unlike paternal absence, the absence of the mother in the long run may impact negatively on 
children’s education in Thailand. Cortes (2014) also concludes that the absence of the mother 
has an overall negative effect on children’s education, further arguing that maternal absence is 
more harmful than the absence of the father. Our findings appear consistent with the evidence 
in these studies. 
 A second interpretation of the increase in female enrolment in secondary education in 
treatment districts resulting from the moratorium is that, while women are working abroad, the 
labor of daughters substitutes the labor of mothers within the household or in other informal 
economic activities. Since women are forced not to migrate by the moratorium, they resume 
domestic activities and free daughters’ time for investing in higher education. A third plausible 
explanation for the increase in enrolment rates in junior secondary education, and consistent 
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with the fact that results are more pronounced for girls than for boys, might relate to aspirations. 
While authorities in Saudi Arabia require completion of primary school to be eligible to migrate 
as a domestic worker, alternative destination countries require completion of junior secondary 
school. These include Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, the positive effect 
of the moratorium on school enrolment for pupils in junior secondary school may be explained 
by the rational decision of the households to invest further in their daughters’ education, in 
order to enable them to migrate as domestic workers towards wealthy households in Hong 
Kong or Singapore.  
d. Robustness checks and placebo effects of the moratorium 
The last section of the paper corroborates the analysis in the previous sections, by showing the 
robustness of our results to a variety of plausible definitions of treatment group districts. This 
section also shows and discusses the results of a falsification exercise, whereby we impose that 
the recent migration moratoria affected other destinations, which in reality remained unaffected 
by the recent migration policies of Indonesia. Both these exercises provide evidence in support 
of our earlier conclusions, as they suggest that the significance in our difference-in-differences 
estimates in Tables 3 and 4 is indeed the result of the 2011 moratorium to Saudi Arabia. 
 In our main analysis, districts where the majority (i.e., 50 percent or more) of female 
migrants in 2005 travelled to Saudi Arabia were grouped in the treatment group, with all the 
remaining districts forming the control group. Although this appears as a natural cutoff to 
distinguish between districts that were more or less exposed to the implementation of the 2011 
migration moratorium, in principle all districts may have been affected by this nationwide 
reform. Thus, alternative cutoffs may seem equally plausible, and indeed useful, to analyze the 
consequences of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on origin communities. Tables 5 and 6 show 
the results of our difference-in-differences analyses on all our outcomes of interest for varying 
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definitions of treatment group districts. In particular, in the first row of Tables 5 and 6, districts 
where 40 percent or more of female migrants in 2005 emigrated to Saudi Arabia were grouped 
in our treatment group; in the second row of Tables 5 and 6, only districts where 60 percent or 
more of female migrants in 2005 departed to Saudi Arabia were grouped in our treatment 
group; finally, in the third row of Tables 5 and 6, only districts where 70 percent or more of 
female migrants in 2005 travelled to Saudi Arabia were grouped in our treatment group. 
 Columns in Tables 5 and 6 are organized in the same way as in Tables 3 and 4. The 
results in Tables 5 and 6 appear very similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. Looking at Table 5, no 
statistically significant effect of the moratorium appears on unemployment, regardless of the 
cutoff used to define treatment and control districts. In contrast, positive and significant effects 
of the 2011 migration moratorium appear for both informality and employment in agriculture, 
for men as well as for women. For both outcomes, a greater effect appears when the strictest 
definition of treatment group is used (i.e., in the third row, where treatment districts are only 
districts where at least 70 percent of female migrants in 2005 travelled to Saudi Arabia). This 
appears sensible, as these are the districts that were expected to be mostly exposed to the 
implementation of the 2011 migration moratorium. Table 6 shows consistent results with those 
in Table 4, as it shows no detectable changes in (log) per capita expenditure, but also a positive 
and significant increase in enrolment rates in junior secondary school due to the 2011 reform. 
For both men and women, a greater effect appears also in this case when the strictest definition 
of treatment group is used in the third row. The overall conclusion from the estimates in Tables 
5 and 6 is that our results are robust to alternative, plausible, definitions of treatment and control 
groups. 
 To further check that our results are not spurious, and that they can be safely attributed 
to the 2011 migration moratorium, this section also shows the results of a placebo test. In this 
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exercise, placebo treatment districts are defined as districts that sent the majority of migrants 
to destinations not affected by the 2011 moratorium to Saudi Arabia. These destinations are: 
Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, USA, and others. 
We then compare all our outcomes of interest between the placebo treatment districts and all 
other Indonesian districts that did not send any migrants overseas in 2005. Districts that sent 
the majority of migrants to Saudi Arabia and those that sent the majority of migrants to 
Malaysia in 2005 were excluded from this falsification test.  
 The results in Tables 7 and 8 show that the 2011 moratorium to Saudi Arabia did not 
have any significant effect on local labor markets, expenditure patterns and school enrolment 
rates in districts where the main destinations of female migrants were other countries. This 
falsification exercise corroborates the validity of our identification strategy, and also supports 
the causal interpretation of the effects of the 2011 moratorium on the outcomes of interest in 
the affected communities. Futher, since the alternative destinations considered in the 
falsification exercise typically attract more skilled female migrants (e.g. knowledge of English 
is required for migrants applying for working permit as a domestic worker in Singapore), we 
can infer that our estimated effects for low-skilled domestic workers affected by the 
moratorium to a traditional destination, are larger than for migrants with higher skills. Finally, 
the falsification exercise also demonstrates that female migrants to Saudi Arabia and female 
migrants to other more recent destinations (e.g. Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Japan, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, USA) are not perfect substitute. This result is also in line with 
the findings on “sticky corridors” by Theoharides (2016), which show that switching between 
destinations (or from traditional destinations to new ones) is typically very hard for migrants. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper studies the consequences of emigration of women on origin communities in 
Indonesia, currently one of the largest origin countries of international migrants in the world. 
It analyses the consequences of a policy introduced by the Indonesian government in 2011 that 
banned the migration of female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia, traditionally the most 
important destination country for Indonesian female migrants. This reform was sudden, as it 
was spurred by the unexpected beheading of an Indonesian migrant in Saudi Arabia and by the 
resulting political turmoil, and it affected hundreds of thousands of women in recent years. At 
the time of writing, the moratorium is still active. This is an unusual natural experiment, which 
provides a rare opportunity to assess the effect of a migration restriction at the origin on the 
origin communities. In addition, since female domestic workers represented around 70% of all 
documented migrants before the introduction of moratoria, this natural experiment is likely to 
have important external validity. 
 Our general conclusion is that the migration moratorium implemented by the 
Indonesian government in 2011 led to a deterioration in the local labor markets at the origin, 
by inducing large flows of both male and female workers into informal employment, and 
employment in agriculture. Although local labor markets appeared capable to absorb the excess 
labor supply generated by the migration restriction with no significant consequences on 
unemployment, the restriction to migration ultimately resulted in an increase in informal 
activities such as agriculture work, which might have worked as a “cushion of last resort” in 
the absence of good jobs opportunities in local labor markets. We find larger flows into 
informality and agriculture for women than for men as a consequence of the moratorium. 
Finally, we also find a positive effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on enrolment in junior 
secondary school, arguably reflecting the importance of the maternal presence in the household 
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for the schooling trajectory of her children, while we do not find a statistically significant effect 
of the moratorium on households’ consumption patterns. 
 From the standpoint of migration policies, our results suggest that alternative policy 
options ought to be considered in order to make migrants more aware of, and better prepared 
for, the migration experience and the associated gains and losses. These policies could include 
more structured pre-departure trainings and information campaigns to raise migrants’ 
awareness of overseas employment and living conditions, enforcement of compulsory 
insurance and protection schemes, and stricter monitoring of intermediaries’ behavior. Further, 
specific policies and trainings are also required to make migrants more adaptable to changes in 
circumstances, aiming to reduce their switching costs to better destinations and working 
opportunities in the presence of sudden external shocks. Finally, our results also stress the 
importance of elevating the policy debate on international migration beyond national borders, 
by encouraging cross-country bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries 
that can maximize the options for safe and documented work for migrants overseas. 
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Figure 1. Female Emigration in Indonesia as % of total documented migrants 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Absolute flows of documented female migrants by destination country 
 
 
 
Source: BNP2TKI (http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks). 
Vertical line indicates the moratoria imposed to Malaysia (June 2009) and 
Saudi Arabia (June 2011). Other Middle East Countries are: United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrein, Jordan. BNP2TKI data in this 
figure are end of the year data.  
 
Source: BNP2TKI (http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks). 
Vertical line indicates the moratoria imposed to Malaysia (June 2009) and 
Saudi Arabia (June 2011). 
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Figure 3. Absolute flows of total documented migrants by destination country 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Absolute flows of total documented migrants by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BNP2TKI (http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks). 
Vertical line indicates the moratoria imposed to Malaysia (June 2009) and 
Saudi Arabia (June 2011). Other Middle East Countries are: United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrein, Jordan. BNP2TKI data in this 
figure are end of the year data. 
Source: BNP2TKI (http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks). 
Vertical line indicates the moratoria imposed to Malaysia (June 2009) and 
Saudi Arabia (June 2011). Other Middle East Countries are: United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrein, Jordan. BNP2TKI data in this 
figure are end of the year data. 
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Figure 5. Absolute flows of total documented migrants by type of job placement in 
destination countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of female emigration rates in Treatment Group villages 
  
 
 
 
Source: BNP2TKI (http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/stat_penempatan/indeks). Vertical line 
indicates the moratoria imposed to Malaysia (June 2009) and Saudi Arabia (June 
2011). Other Middle East Countries are: United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, 
Bahrein, Jordan. BNP2TKI data in this figure are end of the year data. 
Notes: Figure 6 shows female emigration rates for the treatment group districts in our 
analysis. The calculations are based on Podes 2005 data. 
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Figure 7. Distribution of Treated Districts across Provinces in Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on 
unemployment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 7 shows the distribution of treated districts across provinces in Indonesia. No treated districts are found in 16 provinces: these 
are, namely, Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam, Bali, Bangka Belitung, Bengkulu, DI Yogyakarta, East Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, Kep 
Riau, Lampung, Maluku Utara, North Sulawesi, North Sumatera, Papua, Papua Barat, South Sumatera, Southeast Sulawesi.  In 4 provinces, 
between 4 and 8 percent of individuals are in treated districts: these are, namely, East Java, Riau, South Sulawesi and West Sumatera. In 7 
provinces, between 8 and 33 percent of individuals are in treated districts: these are, namely, Central Java, Gorontalo, Jambi, Maluku, West 
Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara and West Sulawesi. In 6 provinces, more than 33 percent of individuals are in treated districts: these are, 
namely, Banten, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, DKI Jakarta, South Kalimantan, and West Java. 
Notes: Figure 8 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on 
unemployment. Control variables included are dummies for whether the 
individuals are male, whether they reside in a urban region and a 
quadratic of age. The omitted year is 2005. Confidence intervals are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the district level. 
 
 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.216 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.764 
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Figure 9. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on 
employment in informal sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on 
employment in agriculture. 
 
Notes: Figure 9 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on the 
likelihood to be employed in the informal sector. Control variables 
included are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether 
they reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. The omitted year is 
2005. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the district level. 
Notes: Figure 10 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on the 
likelihood to be employed in the agricultural sector. Control variables 
included are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether they 
reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. The omitted year is 2005. 
Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
district level. 
 
 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.164 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.067 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.193 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.004 
44 
 
Figure 11. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on (log) per 
capita consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on male 
enrolment in junior secondary school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 11 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent 
confidence intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi 
Arabia on (log) real per capita consumption. Control variables 
included are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether 
they reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. The omitted year 
is 2004. Confidence intervals are based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level. 
 
 
Notes: Figure 12 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on male 
enrolment in junior secondary school. Control variables included are 
dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region and a 
quadratic of age. The omitted year is 2004. Confidence intervals are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the district level. 
 
 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.127 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.056 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.140 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.007 
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Figure 13. Event Study Estimates of Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on female 
enrolment in junior secondary school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 13 shows event-study estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on 
female enrolment in junior secondary school. Control variables included 
are dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region and a 
quadratic of age. The omitted year is 2004. Confidence intervals are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the district level. 
 
 
𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.285 𝑃 > 𝐹 = 0.011 
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Table 1. Districts Characteristics and Balancing Tests: Treatment vs Control Group 
 
Notes: Table 1 shows socio-economic descriptive statistics (averages) calculated in 2005 separately for the treatment and 
control districts used in our analysis. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** 
indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent.   
 
Treatment 
Districts 
Control Districts Treatment – Control 
Difference 
 [1] [2] [1]-[2] 
Fraction of  Kelurahan Villages 0.209 0.291 -0.081 
(0.057) 
Fraction of Urban Villages 0.314 0.312 0.002 
(0.051) 
Fraction of Coastal Villages 0.087 0.167 -0.080** 
(0.031) 
Fraction of Muslim Villages 0.946 0.786 0.160*** 
(0.049) 
Number of Mosques per Village 5.196 3.704 1.492*** 
(0.524) 
Number of Churches per Village 0.510 0.928 -0.418** 
(0.173) 
Number of Hindu Temples per Village 0.056 0.627 -0.571 
(0.430) 
Number of Buddhist Temples per Village 0.061 0.083 -0.021 
(0.028) 
Main Source of Income: Agriculture 0.756 0.764 -0.008 
(0.048) 
Main Source of Income: Mining 0.003 0.005 -0.002 
(0.004) 
Main Source of Income: Industry 0.037 0.018 0.019*** 
(0.007) 
Main Source of Income: Retail 0.098 0.091 0.007 
(0.022) 
Number of Kindergartens 1.633 1.373 0.260 
(0.209) 
Number of Primary Schools 3.840 2.967 0.873*** 
(0.305) 
Number of High Schools 1.467 1.140 0.328 
(0.198) 
Number of Vocational Schools 0.660 0.630 0.030 
(0.140) 
Number of Hospitals 0.060 0.055 0.005 
(0.014) 
Age of Head Village 44.920 44.813 0.106 
(0.323) 
Fraction of Male Headed Villages 0.971 0.965 0.006 
(0.005) 
Average District Population 1,196,416 623,521.1 572,894.8*** 
(90,191.4) 
Average No. Male migrant workers (TKI) 893.8 1693.4 -799.6 
(578.7) 
Average No. Female migrant workers (TKI) 5187.4 1555.3 3632.2*** 
(667.6) 
Total Number of Districts 54 243  
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Table 2. OLS Estimates of the Impact of 2011 Moratorium to Saudi Arabia on the 
Number of Migrants 
 
 Dependent Variable: Number of migrants 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Saudi A. District 14.014*   
(7.294) 
15.587      
(9.538) 
16.894*         
(9.254) 
- - - 
Post Moratorium 2.115* 
(1.132) 
2.613* 
(1.365) 
2.931** 
(1.431) 
2.250* 
(1.147) 
2.855** 
(1.377) 
3.328** 
(1.409) 
Saudi A. District *  
Post Moratorium 
-4.923*** 
(1.514) 
-5.180*** 
(1.920) 
-4.574** 
(1.865) 
-5.079*** 
(1.520) 
-5.286*** 
(1.918) 
-4.853*** 
(1.873) 
       
Mean Dep. Var.         
Pre-Moratorium 
20.227 24.005 24.005 20.227 24.005 24.005 
       
Village Characteristics No No Yes No No Yes 
District Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Population-weighted No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
       
Number of 
Observations 
194946 194946 194946 194946 194946 194946 
Number of Villages 49258 49258 49258 49258 49258 49258 
Number of Districts 286 286 286 286 286 286 
Notes: All the reported difference-in-differences estimates are from OLS regressions of the number of migrants from each 
village that could be identified in Podes continuously from 1999 to 2014. Robust standard errors (clustered at the district level) 
are reported in parentheses. Village control variables included are whether the village is located in a rural or urban area, a 
linear control for the age of the village head and the gender of the village head. Population weights were calculated in 2005. 
Information on migration at the village level was available from 2005 to 2014. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** 
indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 3. Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on Local Labor Market Outcomes. 
 Unemployed Employed in Informal Sector Employed in Agriculture 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
          
Saudi district * 
Moratorium 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
          
Pre-2011 Mean Dep. Var., 
Control Group 
 
0.070 0.059 0.088 0.380 0.451 0.309 0.316 0.395 0.237 
          
Sample Used Full Male Female Full Male Female Full Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.094 0.090 0.103 0.203 0.214 0.178 0.262 0.280 0.226 
N 3407695 2090758 1316937 4865110 2425547 2439563 4865110 2425547 2439563 
Notes: Table 3 shows estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on local labor market outcomes. Robust standard errors (clustered at the district level) 
are reported in parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1], [4] and[7] are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether they reside in a urban region and 
a quadratic of age. Control variables included in columns [2], [3], [5], [6], [8] and [9] are dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. 
A worker is defined as employed in the informal sector according to the Labor Force Surveys (Sakernas), if one of the following conditions is met: i) the worker is a self-
employed in the agriculture sector; ii) the worker is self-employed with temporary or unpaid workers; iii) the worker is a casual worker in either agriculture or non-agriculture 
sector; iv) the worker is an unpaid family member. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 4. Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on log per capita consumption and school enrolment rates. 
 
Log Per capita 
expenditure 
Primary School  
Enrolment 
Junior Secondary School 
Enrolment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Saudi district*Moratorium 
 
-0.024          
(0.016) 
   -0.016       
(0.017) 
0.003  
(0.003) 
0.000      
(0.003) 
0.031***     
(0.010) 
0.038***  
(0.010) 
       
Pre-2011 Mean Dep. Var., 
Control Group 
12.325 12.275 0.930 0.929 0.640 0.660 
       
Sample Used Full Rural Male Female Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.534 0.552 0.022 0.022 0.049 0.046 
N 12951358 10158214 3935961 3715562 2119195 1994885 
Notes: Table 4 shows estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on (log) real per capita consumption and school enrolment outcomes. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the district level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1] and [2] are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether 
they reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. Control variables included in columns [3], [4], [5] and [6] are dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region 
and a quadratic of age. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 5. Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on Local Labor Market Outcomes with Alternative Definitions of Treatment. 
 Unemployed Employed in Informal Sector Employed in Agriculture 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
          
Saudi district 40 percent * 
Moratorium 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
0.013** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
          
Saudi district 60 percent * 
Moratorium 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
0.011* 
(0.007) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.013*** 
(0.006) 
          
Saudi district 70 percent * 
Moratorium 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.023*** 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
          
Sample Used Full Male Female Full Male Female Full Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3407695 2090758 1316937 4865110 2425547 2439563 4865110 2425547 2439563 
Notes: Table 5 shows estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on local labor market outcomes with alternative definitions of treatment. Robust standard 
errors (clustered at the district level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1], [4] and[7] are dummies for whether the individuals are male, 
whether they reside in a urban region, and a quadratic of age. Control variables included in columns [2], [3], [5], [6], [8] and [9] are dummies for whether the individuals reside 
in a urban region, and a quadratic of age. A worker is defined as employed in the informal sector according to the Labor Force Surveys (Sakernas), if one of the following 
conditions is met: i) the worker is a self-employed in the agriculture sector; ii) the worker is self-employed with temporary or unpaid workers; iii) the worker is a casual worker 
in either agriculture or non-agriculture sector; iv) the worker is an unpaid family member. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** 
indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 6. Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on per capita consumption and school enrolment rates with Alternative Definitions of 
Treatment. 
 
Log Per capita 
expenditure 
Primary School  
Enrolment 
Junior Secondary School 
Enrolment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Saudi district 40 percent * Moratorium 
 
 -0.019 
(0.015) 
   -0.012       
(0.016) 
0.003  
(0.003) 
-0.001   
(0.003) 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
0.035*** 
(0.010) 
       
Saudi district 60 percent * Moratorium 
 
 -0.023 
(0.018) 
   -0.019       
(0.018) 
0.005*  
(0.003) 
-0.001   
(0.003) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.044*** 
(0.012) 
       
Saudi district 70 percent * Moratorium 
 
 -0.019 
(0.018) 
   -0.014       
(0.019) 
0.005  
(0.003) 
-0.002   
(0.004) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
       
Sample Used Full Rural Male Female Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12951358 10158214 3935961 3715562 2119195 1994885 
Notes: Table 6 shows estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on real per capita consumption and school enrolment outcomes with alternative definitions 
of treatment. Robust standard errors (clustered at the district level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1] and [2] are dummies for whether the 
individuals are male, whether they reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. Control variables included in columns [3], [4], [5] and [6] are dummies for whether the 
individuals reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 7. Falsification Test: Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on Local Labor Market Outcomes in Placebo Districts. 
 Unemployed Employed in Informal Sector Employed in Agriculture 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
          
Placebo district * 
Moratorium 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
          
Pre-2011 Mean Dep. Var., 
Control Group 
 
0.077 0.064 0.097 0.365 0.433 0.294 0.315 0.392 0.236 
          
Sample Used Full Male Female Full Male Female Full Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.093 0.084 0.109 0.230 0.238 0.215 0.286 0.296 0.267 
N 691554 428594 262960 977613 495860 481753 977613 495860 481753 
Notes: Table 7 shows placebo estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on local labor market outcomes. It shows estimates of the causal effect of the 
moratorium on “Placebo districts”, namely districts that sent the majority of migrants to different destinations (such as Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, 
UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, USA and other destinations), with respect to districts that did not send any migrants overseas in 2005. Districts that sent the majority of migrants to Saudi 
Arabia and those that sent the majority of migrants to Malaysia were excluded from this falsification test. Robust standard errors (clustered at the district level) are reported in 
parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1], [4] and[7] are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether they reside in a urban region and a quadratic of 
age. Control variables included in columns [2], [3], [5], [6], [8] and [9] are dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region and a quadratic of age. A worker is 
defined as employed in the informal sector according to the Labor Force Surveys (Sakernas), if one of the following conditions is met: i) the worker is a self-employed in the 
agriculture sector; ii) the worker is self-employed with temporary or unpaid workers; iii) the worker is a casual worker in either agriculture or non-agriculture sector; iv) the 
worker is an unpaid family member. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 8. Falsification Test: Impact of moratorium to Saudi Arabia on per capita consumption and school enrolment rates in Placebo 
Districts. 
 
Log Per capita 
expenditure 
Primary School  
Enrolment 
Junior Secondary School 
Enrolment 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
       
Placebo district*Moratorium 
 
 0.027   
(0.023) 
   0.027 
(0.026) 
0.012*  
(0.007) 
0.001   
(0.007) 
0.016  
(0.017) 
0.024  
(0.020) 
       
Pre-2011 Mean Dep. Var., Control Group 
 
12.352 12.293 0.916 0.910 0.627 0.639 
       
Sample Used Full Rural Male Female Male Female 
Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Survey fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.522 0.218 0.054 0.022 0.053 0.051 
N 2503668 1947667 755575 704584 388821 365740 
Notes: Table 8 shows placebo estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium to Saudi Arabia on (log) per capita expenditure and school enrolment. As Table 7, it shows 
estimates of the causal effect of the moratorium on “Placebo districts”, namely districts that sent the majority of migrants to different destinations (such as Singapore, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, USA and other destinations), with respect to districts that did not send any migrants overseas in 2005. Districts that 
sent the majority of migrants to Saudi Arabia and those that sent the majority of migrants to Malaysia were excluded from this falsification test. Robust standard errors (clustered 
at the district level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included in columns [1] and [2] are dummies for whether the individuals are male, whether they reside in a 
urban region and a quadratic of age. Control variables included in columns [3], [4], [5] and [6] are dummies for whether the individuals reside in a urban region and a quadratic 
of age. * indicates significance at 10 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, *** indicates significance at 1 percent. 
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Appendix A. KTKLN Card Application: required steps for perspective migrants 
1. Obtain information about the documentation necessary to emigrate for work from the local Office 
of Manpower (Disnaker) or the local Office of Placement Services and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers (BP3TKI) 
2. Prepare ID card, birth certificate, and school diploma. 
3. Prepare a permission letter from spouse/parent/ guardian, verified by the village head. 
4. Fill in a Job Seeker Registration Card issued by Disnaker. 
5. Register as a prospective migrant worker at Disnaker office. 
6. Attend the socialization meeting conducted by Disnaker to inform perspective migrants on 
available job vacancies abroad.  
7. Attend interests and skills selection tests conducted by Disnaker and PPTKIS (in case the profile 
of the prospective migrant fits the criteria of the job vacancy). 
8. Sign the Placement Agreement with PPTKIS (verified by Disnaker) if the selection test is passed. 
9. Reside in temporary accomodations/shelters owned by PPTKIS before departure (for prospective 
migrant workers selected for informal jobs). 
10. Attend trainings, and receive a certificate of attendance. 
11. Attend competency test conducted by Professional Certifying Agency, and obtain a skill 
certificate. 
12. Undertake health test 
13. Undertake a psychological test 
14. Apply for passport 
15. Apply for work permit 
16. Apply for visa 
17. Apply for employment insurance, and obtain an insurance card 
18. Contribute to the Labor Development Fund. 
19. Attend Pre-Departure Briefing (PAP) 
20. Sign a job contract with perspective employer or agency. 
21. The migrant worker ID card (KTKLN) is issued by BNP2TKI 
22. Depart to destination country 
Source: Pocket Book for Prospective Migrant Worker: Working Abroad Legally and Safely, 2011, developed 
by IOM, United States Government Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP), BNP2TKI, 
and the Ministry of Manpower.  
